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Abstract  
The standard measures of distress risk ignore the fact that firm defaults are correlated 
and that some defaults are more likely to occur in bad times.  We use risk premium 
computed from corporate credit spreads to measure a firm’s exposure to systematic 
variation in default risk.  Unlike previously used measures that proxy for a firm’s 
physical probability of default, credit spreads proxy for a risk-adjusted default 
probability and thereby explicitly account for the non-diversifiable component of 
distress risk.  In contrast to prior findings in the literature, we find that stocks that have 
higher credit risk premia, that is stocks with higher systematic default risk exposures, 
have higher expected equity returns which are largely explained by the market factor.  
We confirm the robustness of these results by using an alternative systematic default risk 
factor for firms that do not have bonds outstanding.  Consistent with the theoretical 
result in George and Hwang (2010), we also show that firms react to increases in their 
systematic default risk exposures by reducing their leverage, leading to lower physical 
probabilities of distress.  Our results show no evidence of firms with high systematic 
default risk exposure delivering anomalously low returns.   
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1. Introduction 
 
A fundamental tenet of asset pricing is that investors should be compensated with higher 
returns for bearing systematic risk that cannot be diversified.  As default risk remains a 
major source of potential large losses to equity investors, a number of recent papers have 
examined whether default risk is a systematic risk and whether it is priced in the cross 
section of equity returns.  From a theoretical perspective, default risk can be a priced 
factor if a firm’s capital asset pricing model (CAPM) beta does not fully capture default-
related risk.  Empirical work has focused on determining the probability of firms failing 
to meet their financial obligations using accounting and market-based variables and 
testing to see if estimated default probabilities are related to future realized returns. The 
existing empirical evidence contradicts theoretical expectations and suggests that firms 
with high default risk earn significantly lower average returns.
2
   
The low returns on stocks with high default risk cannot be explained by Fama-French 
(1993) risk factors.  Stocks with high distress risk tend to have higher market betas and 
load more heavily on size and value factors.  This leads to significantly negative alphas 
for the high-minus-low default risk hedge portfolio and makes the anomaly even larger in 
magnitude. These empirical results provide a challenge to the standard risk-reward trade-
off in financial markets and to the contention that small firms and value firms earn high 
average returns because they are financially distressed (Chan and Chen 1991; Fama and 
French 1996; Kapadia 2011). 
We argue that the anomalous results documented in the literature are due to 
incorrectly measuring systematic default risk.  Figure 1, which plots the historical default 
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 See for example Dichev (1998) and Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) for a discussion of this 
anomaly.  
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rates on Moody’s rated corporate issuers, suggests that default rates are highly dependent 
on the stage of the business cycle.  This casual analysis of the historical data suggests that 
there is an important systematic component of default risk and that the incidence of 
ﬁnancial distress is correlated with macroeconomic shocks such as major recessions.  
Previous papers measure financial distress by determining firms’ expected probabilities 
of default inferred from historical default data.  This calculation ignores the fact that firm 
defaults are correlated and that some defaults are more likely to occur in bad times, and 
therefore fails to appropriately account for the systematic nature of default risk.  
Investors, however, will take into account the covariance of default losses from a 
company with the rest of the assets in their portfolio when pricing distress risk.
3
    
  We use credit risk premium computed from corporate credit spreads to proxy for a 
firm’s exposure to the non-diversifiable portion of default risk.  The fixed-income 
literature provides evidence of a significant risk premium component in corporate credit 
spreads, justifying our use of this measure as a proxy for firm exposure to systematic 
default risk.
4
  It has been well-documented (Almeida and Philippon 2007; Berndt, Duffie, 
Ferguson and Schranz 2005; Hull, Predescu, and White 2004) that there is a substantial 
difference between the risk-adjusted (or risk-neutral, as commonly designated in 
contingent claim pricing) and physical probabilities of default. Ranking stocks based on 
their physical default probabilities inferred from historical default data—as done in 
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 To illustrate this point, consider two portfolios of bonds with average default probabilities equal to 5% a 
year.  Even though both portfolios have the same average default rate, one bond portfolio contains 
companies that are likely to experience defaults in good states of the world whereas the second portfolio 
contains companies that are likely to default in bad states of the world.  The timing of the defaults would be 
as important in pricing these bond portfolios as their average default rates.  
 
4
 The spread between corporate bond yields and maturity-matched treasury rates is too high to be fully 
captured by expected default and has been shown to contain a large risk premium for systematic default 
risk. See, for detailed analysis, Elton et al. (2001), Huang and Huang (2003), Longstaff et al. (2005), 
Driessen (2005), and Berndt et al. (2005). 
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Dichev (1998), Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), and others in this literature—
implicitly assumes that stocks with high physical probabilities of default also have high 
exposures to systematic variation in default risk. George and Hwang (2010) show that a 
firm’s physical probability of default does not necessarily reflect its exposure to 
systematic default risk. In fact, George and Hwang (2010) show that firms with higher 
sensitivities to systematic default risk make capital structure choices that reduce their 
physical probabilities of distress.  It is therefore not correct to rank firms based on their 
physical default probabilities when pricing financial distress, because such a ranking does 
not properly reflect firms’ exposures to systematic default risk, the only type of default 
risk that should be rewarded with a premium.   
Moreover, previous papers have shown that three stock characteristics—high 
idiosyncratic volatility, high leverage, and low profitability—are associated with high 
historical default rates.  However, these are the same characteristics that are known to be 
associated with low expected future returns. Within the q-theory framework (Cochrane 
1991; Liu, Whited and Zhang 2009), low profitability (more likely to default) firms have 
low expected future returns.  Similarly, firms with high leverage (more likely to default) 
and high idiosyncratic volatility (more likely to default) have low expected future stock 
returns (Korteweg 2010; Dimitrov and Jain 2008; Penman, Richardson and Tuna 2007; 
Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang 2009).  It is not clear if the distress anomaly is at least 
partially attributable to one or more of these previously documented return relationships.
5
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 There is a strong relationship between distress risk and these three stock characteristics.  When we form 
quintile portfolios sorted on physical probabilities of default -computed using coefficients from Column 1 
of Table 2-, idiosyncratic volatility increases monotonically from 2.5% for the lowest distress group to 
4.5% for the highest distress group.  Leverage increases from 0.22 for the lowest distress group to 0.61 for 
the highest distress group.  Similarly, profitability for the lowest distress group is 1.2% and decreases 
monotonically to -1.1% for the highest distress group.  The 3-factor alpha for the zero cost portfolio formed 
by going long high distress stocks and shorting low distress stocks is -1.078% per month, yet this premium 
decreases to -0.36% after controlling for leverage.  When we control for idiosyncratic volatility, the return 
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We take a different approach and use a market-based measure, credit risk premium 
computed from corporate credit spreads, to proxy for systematic default risk exposure.  
We compute credit spreads as the difference between the bond yield of the firm and the 
corresponding maturity-matched treasury rate.  We then compute credit risk premium by 
removing expected losses, taxes, and liquidity effects (Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann 
2001; Chen, Lesmond, and Wei 2007; Driessen and de Jong 2007) and using only the 
fraction of the spread that is due to systematic default risk exposure.  This measure offers 
two distinct advantages over others that have been used in the literature.  First, unlike 
stock characteristics used to measure default risk, which may reflect information about 
future returns unrelated to distress risk, credit spreads reflect the market consensus view 
of the credit risk of the underlying firm.  Second, credit spreads contain risk premium for 
systematic default risk, and are a proxy for the market-implied risk-adjusted probability 
of default.  Using credit risk premia sorted portfolios, we find that firms with higher 
exposures to systematic default risk have higher expected equity returns.  This premium 
is subsumed by the market factor, as predicted by structural models of default and 
rational asset pricing theory, and is further reduced economically and statistically by the 
Fama-French risk factors.    
Our measure of systematic default risk exposure, calculated from credit spreads, 
limits the sample of firms to those that have issued corporate bonds.  To ensure the 
robustness of our results, we show that when firms are ranked based on their physical 
default probabilities, as previously done in the literature, the distress anomaly is also 
observed in the Bond sample.  To further alleviate sample selection issues, we extend the 
                                                                                                                                                 
spread between high and low distress stocks reduces to -0.29%.  Finally, controlling for profitability 
reduces the spread to -0.29% per month, making it statistically insignificant.     
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analysis to the full CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample. We compute a measure of systematic 
default risk exposure for all firms regardless of whether they have bonds outstanding. We 
assume a single factor structure for default risk and measure a firm’s systematic default 
risk exposure as the sensitivity of its default probability to the common factor.  We refer 
to the common factor as the systematic default risk factor, and the sensitivity of a firm’s 
default probability to the common factor as its systematic default risk beta.  First, we 
verify that systematic default risk beta is significantly priced in the cross section of 
corporate bond risk premia, justifying our use of corporate bond risk premium as a 
measure of systematic default risk exposure. This relationship is robust to controlling for 
bond ratings, physical default probabilities, accounting variables, market variables, and 
structural model parameters.  Second, we form decile portfolios by sorting all equities in 
the CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample based on their systematic default risk betas.  Consistent 
with the bond sample results, we find that the portfolio with the highest systematic 
default risk exposure has higher equity returns than the lowest systematic default risk 
exposure portfolio.  Moreover, we find that once we control for the market factor, the 
difference in returns between the highest and lowest systematic default risk portfolios 
becomes insignificant.  
In our analyses of the sample of firms with bonds outstanding and of the full CRSP-
COMPUSTAT sample, we find no evidence of firms with high systematic default risk 
exposure delivering anomalously low equity returns.  These results are consistent with 
the basic structural models of default in which aggregate risk factors drive default 
probabilities as well as the returns on bonds and equities (Merton 1974; Campello, Chen 
and Zhang 2008).   
  7 
Our systematic default risk measure allows us to test the George and Hwang (2010) 
hypothesis that firms with low exposures to systematic distress risk choose high leverage 
and, as a result, have high physical default probabilities despite having low systematic 
default risk exposures.   We find empirical support for this hypothesis using the two 
alternative measures of systematic default risk exposure.  In particular, we find that 
changes in systematic distress risk exposure predict changes in leverage in the next 
period.  Ours is not the first paper to study the relationship between default risk and 
equity returns.  Dichev (1998) uses Altman’s z-score and Ohlson’s o-score to measure 
financial distress.  He finds a negative relationship between default risk and equity 
returns for the 1981–1995 time period.  In a related study, Griffin and Lemmon (2002), 
using the o-score to measure default risk, find that growth stocks with high probabilities 
of default have low returns.  Using a comprehensive set of accounting and market-based 
measures, Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008, hereafter CHS) show that stocks with 
high risk of default deliver anomalously low returns.  Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008), 
who obtain default risk measures from Moody’s KMV, find results similar to those of 
Dichev (1998) and CHS (2008). They attribute their findings to the violation of the 
absolute priority rule.  Vassalou and Xing (2004) find some evidence that distressed 
stocks, mainly in the small value group, earn higher returns.
6
 
Avramov, Jostova, and Philipov (2007) show that  the negative return for high default 
risk stocks is concentrated around rating downgrades.  Chava and Purnanandam (2010) 
argue that the poor performance of high distress stocks is limited to the post-1980 period, 
when investors were positively surprised by defaults.  When they use implied cost of 
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 Da and Gao (2010) argue that Vassalou and Xing’s results are driven by one-month returns on stocks in 
the highest default likelihood group that trade at very low prices.  They show that returns are contaminated 
by microstructure noise and that the positive one-month return is compensation for increased liquidity risk. 
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capital estimates from analysts' forecasts to proxy for ex-ante expected returns, they find 
a positive relationship between default risk and expected returns.   Our paper contributes 
to the literature by constructing a default risk measure that ranks equities explicitly based 
on their exposures to systematic default risk rather than ranking firms based on their 
physical probabilities of default.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the data.  Section 3 
describes the physical default probability measure used in this study.  Section 4 describes 
the use of credit spreads as a proxy for systematic default risk exposure.  Section 5 
contains asset pricing tests, in which equities are ranked based on their physical default 
probabilities and systematic default risk exposures.  Section 6 describes the construction 
and use of an alternative systematic default risk factor and extends the equity return 
analyses to the full CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample.  Finally, Section 7 concludes.   
 
2. Data 
Corporate bond data used to compute the credit risk-premium in this study comes 
from three separate databases: the Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database (Lehman) 
for the period 1974 to 1997, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
Database (NAIC) for the period 1994 to 2006, and the Trade Reporting and Compliance 
Engine (TRACE) system dataset for the period 2003 to 2010.  We also use the Fixed 
Income Securities Database (FISD) for bond descriptions.  Due to the small number of 
observations prior to 1980, we include only the period 1980 to 2010 in the analyses that 
follow.  We match the bond information with firm-level accounting and price information 
obtained from COMPUSTAT and CRSP for the same time period. We exclude financial 
  9 
firms (SIC codes 6000–6999) from the sample.  To avoid the influence of microstructure 
noise, we also exclude firms priced less than one dollar.   
Our sample includes all U.S. corporate bonds listed in the above datasets that satisfy a 
set of selection criteria commonly used in the corporate bond literature.
7
  We exclude all 
bonds that are matrix-priced (rather than market-priced) from the sample.  We remove all 
bonds with equity or derivative features (i.e., callable, puttable, and convertible bonds), 
bonds with warrants, and bonds with floating interest rates. Finally, we eliminate all 
bonds that have less than one year to maturity.   
For all selected bonds, we extract beginning of month credit spreads, calculated as the 
difference between the corporate bond yield and the corresponding maturity-matched 
treasury rate.  There are a number of extreme observations for the variables constructed 
from the different bond datasets. To ensure that statistical results are not heavily 
influenced by outliers, we set all observations higher than the 99
th
 percentile value of a 
given variable to the 99
th
 percentile value.  All values lower than the first percentile of 
each variable are winsorized in the same manner.  Using credit spreads we compute 
credit risk premia (CRP) as described in the next section.  For each firm, we then 
compute a value-weighted average of that firm’s CRP, using market values of the bonds 
as weights.  There are 121,714 firm-months and 1,071 unique firms with CRP and 
corresponding firm-level accounting and market data.  There is no potential survivorship 
bias in our sample as we do not exclude bonds of firms that have gone bankrupt or bonds 
that have matured.  
We use hazard regressions using historical defaults to compute physical default 
probabilities.  Corporate defaults between 1981 and 2010 are identified from the 
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 See for instance Duffee (1999), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), and Avramov et al. 
(2007). 
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Moody’s Default Risk Services’ Corporate Default database, SDC Platinum’s Corporate 
Restructurings Database, Lynn M. LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database, and 
Shumway’s (2001) list of defaults. We choose 1981 as the earliest year for identifying 
defaults because the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is likely to have caused the 
associations between accounting variables and the probability of default to change.  
Furthermore, we have little corporate bond yield information prior to 1980.  In all, we 
obtain a total of 1,290 firm defaults covering the period 1981–2010.  We have complete 
accounting-based measures for 728 of these defaults.  Of these 728 defaults, 118 also 
have corresponding corporate bond information.  For the full CRSP-COMPUSTAT 
sample as well as for the subsample of firms that have bonds outstanding we use 
accounting and market-based variables used by CHS (2008) when predicting defaults.  
The variables we use are the following: NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average 
of past values of the ratio of net income to the market value of total assets; TLMTA is the 
ratio of total liabilities to the market value of total assets; EXRETAVG is a geometrically 
declining average of monthly log excess stock returns relative to the S&P 500 index; 
SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the previous three months; 
RSIZE is the log ratio of market capitalization to the market value of the S&P 500 index; 
CASHMTA is the ratio of cash to the market value of total assets; MB is the market-to-
book ratio, PRICE is the log price per share truncated at $15 for shares priced above 
$15
8
; DD is  the Merton (1974) “distance-to-default” measure, which is the difference 
between the asset value of the firm and the face value of its debt, scaled by the standard 
deviation of the firm’s asset value.  These variables are described in detail in the 
Appendix. 
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 This is following CHS (2008).  Truncation in this setting does not constitute eliminating observations that 
are priced greater than $15.  It means that firm observations with a price greater than $15 is set to $15. 
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The bond sample covers a small portion of the total number of companies, but a 
substantial portion in terms of total market capitalization.  For instance, in the year 1997, 
the number of firms with active bonds in our sample constitutes about 4% of all the firms 
in the market.  However, in terms of market capitalization, the dataset captures about 
40% of aggregate equity market value in 1997.  We compute summary statistics for 
default measures and financial characteristics of the companies in our bond sample and 
for all companies in CRSP.  These results are summarized in Table 1.  As not all 
companies issue bonds, it is important to discuss the limitations of our bond dataset.  Not 
surprisingly, companies in the bond sample are larger and show a slight value tilt.  They 
also have higher profitability, more leverage, and higher equity returns; they hold less 
cash and are less likely to default. There is, however, significant dispersion in size, 
market-to-book ratio, default probability, and credit spread values of firms in the bond 
sample.  To ensure that our results are not driven by sample selection, in Section 5, we 
show that when firms are ranked based on physical default probabilities the distress 
anomaly is observed in the Bond sample.  In Section 6, we extend the analyses to the 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT sample. 
 
3. Physical Default Probabilities  
There is a vast literature on modeling the probability of default.  In this paper, we utilize 
dynamic models of default prediction (Shumway 2001; Chava and Jarrow 2004; CHS 
2008), that avoid biases of static models by adjusting for potential duration dependence 
issues.
9
  We compute physical default probabilities by estimating a hazard regression 
using the set of defaults described in the previous section.  We use information available at 
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 Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) are examples of such static models. 
 
  12 
the end of the calendar month to predict defaults 12 months ahead.  Specifically, we 
assume that the probability of default in 12 months, conditional on survival in the 
dataset for 11 months, is given by: 
 
 
 
1 1 12 2 12
12 12 1
1
(Y =1|Y =0)= 
1 exp
i i i
t t t i
t
PD
X
 (1) 
where 1 12Y
i
t  is an indicator that equals one if the firm defaults in 12 months 
conditional on survival for 11 months. 1X
i
t  is a vector of explanatory variables 
available at the time of prediction.  We use accounting and market-based variables used 
in CHS (2008) when predicting defaults.  In addition we use Merton’s distance to default 
measure that has been utilized in a number of previous studies.
10
  All the variables 
included in the hazard regressions are described in detail in the Appendix.  We use 
quarterly accounting variables lagged by two months and market variables lagged by 
one month to ensure that this information is available at the time of default prediction.   
We run two sets of hazard regressions, one using the sample of firms in the Bond 
sample, and the other using all firms in the CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample.  As mentioned 
earlier, to ensure that our results are not driven by sample selection, we construct physical 
default probabilities for the Bond sample using coefficients obtained from hazard 
regressions that use only the firms in the Bond sample.  This ensures that the distress 
anomaly documented by the prior literature exists for the subset of firms that have bonds 
outstanding.   
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 Merton’s (1974) structural default model treats the equity value of a company as a call option on the 
company’s assets.  The probability of default is based on the “distance-to-default” measure, which is the 
difference between the asset value of the firm and the face value of its debt, scaled by the standard 
deviation of the firm’s asset value.  There are a number of different approaches to calculating the distance-
to-default measure. We follow CHS (2008) and Hillegeist et al. (2004) in constructing this measure, the 
details of which are provided in the appendix. 
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Table 2 reports the results from the hazard regressions.  In the first column, we use 
the same covariates (NIMTAAVG, TLMTA, EXRETAVG, SIGMA, RSIZE, CASHMTA, MB 
and PRICE) used in CHS (2008) to predict corporate defaults.  The sample includes all 
CRSP-COMPUSTAT firms for the 1980 to 2010 time period.  As a comparison, we 
report the estimates from the CHS (2008) study in column 2.  The coefficient estimates 
from these two regressions are very similar, suggesting that our default dataset, although 
smaller than the CHS (2008) default dataset, captures a significant portion of the 
variation in firm defaults.  In column 3, we limit the sample to firms with only bonds 
outstanding.  Relative value (MB), liquidity position (CASHMTA), and share price 
(PRICE) are no longer statistically significant predictors of failure.  In the bond sample, 
relatively larger firms are less likely to default, consistent with the full CRSP-
COMPUSTAT sample.  We also use Merton’s distance to default (DD) measure as a 
predictor of defaults in the bond sample (reported in column 6).  We obtain qualitatively 
similar results to those in the full CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample using our own set of 
defaults (reported in column 4) as well as when compared to CHS (2008) results 
(reported in column 5). 
 
4. Corporate Spread as a Measure of Systematic Default Risk Exposure 
In this section, we describe our use of corporate bond risk premia to measure systematic 
distress risk exposure. 
There is now a significant body of research that shows that compensation for default 
risk constitutes a considerable portion of credit spreads.  Huang and Huang (2003), using 
the Longstaff-Schwartz (1995) model, find that distress risk accounts for 39%, 34%, 
41%, 73%, and 93% of the corporate bond spread, respectively, for bonds rated AA, A, 
  14 
BAA, BA, and B.  Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) use the information in credit 
default swaps (CDS) to obtain direct measures of the size of the default and non-default 
components in corporate spreads.  They find that the default component represents 51% 
of the spread for AAA/AA-rated bonds, 56% for A-rated bonds, 71% for BBB-rated 
bonds, and 83% for BB-rated bonds. Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) and Zhu (2006) 
show significant similarity in the information content of CDS spreads and bond credit 
spreads with respect to default.  They confirm, through co-integration tests, that the 
theoretical parity relationship between these two credit spreads holds as a long run 
equilibrium condition.
11
   
As mentioned earlier, our focus in this paper is on measuring compensation for 
systematic default risk exposure.  We create this measure by extracting the credit risk 
premium component from the credit spreads.  Although credit risk makes up a significant 
portion of corporate spreads, liquidity risk and taxes have also been shown to be 
important (Elton et al. 2001; Chen, Lesmond, and Wei 2007; Driessen and de Jong 2007). 
In computing the credit risk premium, we take into account expected losses, taxes, and 
liquidity effects, and use only the fraction of the spread that is likely to be due to 
systematic default risk exposure.  We follow Driessen and de Jong (2007), Elton et al. 
(2001), and Campello, Chen, and Zhang (2008) and compute the credit risk premium 
(CRP) for each bond i and month t as: 
 
        [(      (      )  (       ))  (       )
 
]
 
 ⁄
 (       )
              
 
(2) 
                                                 
11
 In this study we have chosen to use bond spreads instead of CDS spreads because bond data is available 
for a substantially larger number of companies and is available for a much longer time period. 
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In Equation (2), PD is the τ-year physical probability of default.12  L is the loss rate in the 
event of default.  We follow Elton et al. (2001) and Driessen and de Jong (2007) and use 
historical loss rates reported in Altman and Kishore (1998) by rating category.  The loss 
rates vary from 32% for AAA-rated firms to 62% for CCC-rated firms.  CY is the τ-
maturity corporate bond yield, and YG is the corresponding maturity-matched treasury 
yield.  The equation assumes that all losses are incurred at maturity.   
Because bond investors have to pay state and local taxes on bond coupons whereas 
treasury bond investors do not, we also remove this tax differential from the corporate 
yields. Expected tax costs, TX, are computed as: 
 
 [(       )                  (      )]    . (3) 
   
The first part of Equation (3) captures the coupon rate, Coupon, conditional on no 
default.  The second part captures the tax refund in the event of default. TR is the 
effective tax rate and following Elton et al. (2001) is set to 4.875%.   
The recent literature emphasizes the role of liquidity risk in the pricing of corporate 
bonds (Driessen and de Jong 2007; Lin, Wang and Wu 2011; Downing, Underwood and 
Xing 2005).  We explicitly account for the liquidity effect in credit spreads by computing 
liquidity risk premium for each bond in our dataset.  The analysis follows Driessen and 
de Jong (2007) and is based on a linear multifactor asset pricing model in which expected 
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 We compute physical default probabilities using the sample and variables from column 3 of Table 2.  In 
computing physical default probabilities, we use quarterly accounting variables lagged by two months and 
market variables lagged by one month to ensure that this information is available at the beginning of the 
month over which physical default probabilities are measured. To compute cumulative physical default 
probabilities we form ten groups (similar to rating categories) based on estimated one year default 
probabilities.  We then compute the one year transition matrix for the ten groups as in Moody’s (2011).  We 
also compute cumulative physical default probabilities for each group up to ten years.   To compute 
cumulative physical default probabilities beyond ten years, we use the one year transition matrix assuming 
it remains constant.   We obtain similar results if we use Moody’s (2011) cumulative physical default 
probabilities and one year transition matrix.  
  16 
corporate bond returns are explained by their exposure to market risk and liquidity risk 
factors.
13
  We consider two types of liquidity risk, one originating from the equity market 
and one from the treasury bond market. For the stock market, we use the liquidity 
innovations of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003); for the treasury market, we use changes in 
quoted bid-ask spreads on long-term treasury bonds.
14
  We compute expected bond 
returns for 11 rating-maturity groups using equation (2), and use a cross-sectional 
regression to compute risk premium associated with liquidity innovations in the stock and 
treasury markets.
15
  We then subtract the computed liquidity premium, LQ, from the 
corporate bond spreads with the corresponding rating and maturity.  Table 3 summarizes 
the computations for different rating-maturity groups.   
Our results are in line with the findings in the literature (Driessen and de Jong 2007; 
Elton et al. 2001; Campello, Chen and Zhang 2008).  Figure 2 plots the computed 
expected losses, taxes, and liquidity premium against corporate spreads.  In the rest of 
this paper, we use the portion of credit spreads that compensates for systematic default 
risk exposure, net of expected losses, taxes, and liquidity premium.  We call this variable 
CRP (Credit Risk Premium).   
It is possible that the CRP may contain risk premia that is not purely due to distress 
risk.  For instance, if the stock and bond markets are integrated, traditional capital 
structure theory implies that a company’s equity and credit premia will be linked and 
driven by the same aggregate risk factors.  Many papers, however, document difficulties 
in relating equity factors and bond returns (Fama and French 1993; Elton et al. 2001).  To 
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 As in Driessen and de Jong (2007) we also included changes in implied market volatility orthogonalized 
by market returns as an additional factor, and we obtained similar results. 
 
14
 We thank Alex Hsu for providing the data on treasury bond bid-ask quotes. 
   
15
 We refer to bonds with maturity greater than seven years as having “long maturity” and with maturity 
less than seven years as having “short maturity.”  
  17 
the extent that the CRP contains premia unrelated to distress risk, they would be captured 
by the standard risk factors in the factor regressions we carry out in the next two sections.   
  
5. Pricing of Distress Risk 
5.1. Physical PD’s and Equity Returns 
In this section, we analyze the relationship between physical default probabilities and 
future stock returns using the firms in the CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample and using the 
firms that have bonds outstanding in the Bond sample.  For the CRSP-COMPUSTAT 
sample we compute default probabilities using coefficients obtained from column 1 of 
Table 2.
16
  For the Bond sample we compute default probabilities using coefficients 
obtained from column 3 of Table 2.  In computing these default probabilities, we use 
quarterly accounting variables lagged by two months and market variables lagged by one 
month to ensure that this information is available at the beginning of the month over 
which default probabilities are measured.  We sort stocks in the full CRSP-
COMPUSTAT sample into deciles each month from 1981 through 2010 according to 
their physical default probabilities, and compute value-weighted returns for each 
portfolio.  If a delisting return is available, we use the delisting return; otherwise, we use 
the last available return in CRSP.   
We repeat the same analyses for stocks that have bonds outstanding.  We construct 
physical default probabilities in the Bond sample using coefficients obtained from hazard 
regressions using the bond sample.  This analysis ensures that the distress risk anomaly 
observed in the full CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample also exists for the bond sample when 
                                                 
16
 We obtain similar results using CHS coefficients computed on a rolling basis (we thank Jens Hilscher for 
providing this data), Merton’s distance-to-default measure, Ohlson’s o-score and Altman’s z-score, which 
are not reported to save space.     
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firms are ranked using physical default probabilities.  To save space, we report returns for 
only the top and bottom deciles, and the difference between the top and bottom deciles.   
We compute value-weighted returns for these decile portfolios on a monthly basis 
and regress the portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate on the market (MKT), size 
(SMB), value (HML), and momentum (MOM) factors: 
 
   
         
          
          
          
        
  (4) 
 
In Panel A of Table 4, we report portfolio return results  for the CRSP-
COMPUSTAT sample.  Our results are consistent with those obtained in previous 
studies. Stocks in the highest default risk portfolio have significantly lower returns.  The 
difference in returns between the highest and lowest default risk portfolios is -1.184% per 
month.  The alphas from the market and the 3- and 4-factor models are economically and 
statistically significant.  The monthly 4-factor alpha for the zero cost portfolio formed by 
going long on stocks in the highest default risk decile, and short on stocks in the lowest 
default risk decile is -0.83% per month.  Portfolio return analyses that utilize historical 
default probabilities calculated using coefficients from the bond sample are reported in 
Panel B of Table 4.  The results are weaker for the bond sample, but still economically 
and statistically significant.  Using firms that have credit spread information, the monthly 
4-factor alpha for the zero cost portfolio formed by going long on stocks in the highest 
default risk decile and short on stocks in the lowest default risk decile is -0.49%.  
Distressed stocks load positively on the size and value factors.  The negative loading on 
the momentum factor is consistent with the intuition that distressed stocks tend to have 
low returns prior to portfolio formation.   
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As a robustness check, we also compute risk adjusted returns per unit of distress risk 
for the bond sample as well as for the CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample.  One reason that the 
distress anomaly is smaller in the bond sample is that the companies in the highest 
distress decile in the CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample have higher default probabilities than 
the stocks in the highest distress decile in the bond sample.  To take into account the 
differences in default probabilities, we follow CHS (2008) and regress the return of each 
long-short portfolio onto the differences in log default probabilities including no intercept 
in the regression.  The coefficients from this regression would provide us with a distress 
premium per unit of log default probability.  We use long-short distress portfolio returns 
adjusted for the Fama–French three-factor model.  The coefficient estimate on the log 
default probability is 6.492 (t-stat = 5.02) for the CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample and 5.657 
(t-stat = 3.24) for the bond sample, suggesting that per unit of log default probability, the 
distress effect is similar in the CRSP-COMPUSTAT and Bond samples. 
The analyses in this section show that using physical default probabilities computed 
in the Bond sample and the CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample produces results similar to 
those of CHS (2008) and others in the literature.  The distress anomaly persists in our 
Bond sample when we use physical probabilities of default to rank firms. 
 
5.2  Credit Risk Premium and Equity Returns 
In this section, we examine how CRPs (credit risk premia) are related to future realized 
equity returns
17
.  We sort stocks into deciles from 1981 to 2010, using CRPs in the 
previous month.  We compute value-weighted returns for each portfolio and update the 
                                                 
17
 We also analyzed how SPREADs (credit spreads) are related to future realized equity returns.  The 
returns on portfolios sorted on SPREADs and CRPs have very similar returns.  Furthermore, the differences 
in raw returns between the highest and lowest default risk portfolios are very similar whether firms are 
sorted on SPREAD or CRP. 
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portfolios each month.  As before, if a delisting return is available we use the delisting 
return; otherwise we use the last available return in CRSP.  To save space, we only report 
returns for the top and bottom decile portfolios, and the return difference between the top 
and bottom deciles in Table 5.   
Our results challenge those obtained in the previous studies.  Using CRP’s  as a 
measure of systematic default risk exposure, the difference in raw returns between the 
highest and lowest default risk portfolios is 0.521% per month and statistically 
significant.  The 4-factor monthly alpha for a portfolio formed by going long on stocks in 
the highest default risk exposure portfolio and short on stocks in the lowest default risk 
exposure portfolio is -0.005% and statistically insignificant when we use CRP as our 
measure of systematic default risk exposure.   
There is a positive relationship between CRP and raw equity returns, and the return 
of the high-minus-low excess spread portfolio is statistically significant. CAPM and 
multi-factor regressions show that alphas are subsumed in all CRP portfolios, suggesting 
that variation in systematic default risk exposure is captured mainly by the market factor 
and partly by the size and value factors.  The size and value factors have statistically 
significant positive loadings for the high minus low CRP portfolio suggesting that these 
factors are intimately related to systematic default risk exposure.  These results are 
consistent with structural models of default in which aggregate risk factors drive default 
probabilities as well as the returns on bonds and equities (Merton 1974; Campello, Chen 
and Zhang 2008).     
Ranking stocks on their physical default probabilities inferred from historical data, as 
done in Dichev (1998), CHS (2008), and others, implicitly assumes that high default 
probability stocks also have high exposures to the systematic component of default risk. 
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Using CRP, we explicitly rank firms based on their exposures to the systematic 
component of default risk and we find no evidence of systematic default risk being 
negatively priced.  
 
6. Alternative Measure of Systematic Default Risk 
We now extend the analysis of Section 5.2 to the full CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample 
to ensure the robustness of our results.  In particular, we follow Hilscher and Wilson 
(2010) and identify a measure of systematic default risk exposure that can be calculated 
for all firms regardless of whether they have bonds outstanding.
18
  We form decile 
portfolios by sorting all equities in the CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample based on their 
systematic default risk betas and investigate the pricing of systematic default risk in the 
cross section of equity returns.   
We measure a firm’s systematic default risk exposure as the sensitivity of its default 
probability to the median default probability of all firms in the CRSP-COMPUSTAT 
sample.  We refer to this measure as systematic default risk beta.  We find that portfolios 
with high systematic default risk betas, on average, have higher returns than portfolios 
with low systematic default risk betas, verifying our results in Section 5.2.  We also show 
that systematic default risk beta is significantly priced in the cross-section of credit risk 
premia validating the use of CRP as a measure of systematic default risk exposure.  
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 Hilscher and Wilson (2010) use the systematic default risk exposure measure to examine whether 
company ratings contain information related to systematic default risk.  We analyze the impact of 
systematic default risk exposure on equity returns.     
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6.1 Measuring Systematic Default Beta 
We assume that historical default probabilities have a single common factor and use the 
median cross-sectional default probability to proxy for this common factor.  The 
assumption of a single factor is a good approximation as we find that the first principal 
component explains 74.7% of variation in default probabilities.
19
  The first principal 
component and the median default probability have a correlation of 0.96 and are 
significantly higher during and after recessions. This is consistent with economic theory 
that suggests that systematic risk (discount rate) is higher during recessions.  
To compute each firm’s sensitivity to the systematic default factor, we estimate the 
following regression for each firm over 48-month rolling windows: 
 
    
    
             
         
 . (5) 
 
   
  is the 12-month annualized physical default probability for firm i in month t.  It 
is computed each month using coefficients from column 1 in Table 2.  As before, in 
computing physical default probabilities, we use quarterly accounting variables lagged by 
two months and market variables lagged by one month to ensure that this information is 
available at the beginning of the month over which default probabilities are measured.  
     is the cross-sectional median physical default probability across all firms.
20
  
           
  is exposure to systematic default risk in month τ, obtained from rolling 
regressions using the past 48 months of data. 
                                                 
19
 Extracting principal components in the standard way from the full panel of CRSP-COMPUSTAT firms is 
problematic because the cross-section is much larger than the time series. We therefore first shrink the size 
of the cross-section by assigning each firm-month to a given rating-month and calculating equal-weighted 
average 12-month cumulative default probabilities as done by Hilscher and Wilson (2010). We group all 
firms with ratings of CCC+ and below together.  This leaves us with a panel of 17 ratings groups with 360 
months of data. Forming industry groups rather than ratings groups yields similar results. 
 
20
 The results are similar if we instead use the first principal component. 
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6.2 Default Risk Beta and Credit Spreads 
In this section, we analyze the relationship between our measure of credit risk premium 
calculated in Section 4 and systematic default risk beta.  We show that systematic default 
risk beta              can explain the cross-sectional variation in credit risk premia 
in corporate bonds.  This finding provides further evidence that SYSDEFBETA  is a good 
measure of systematic default risk exposure, and that investors demand compensation for 
this exposure.  This result also validates our use of CRPs  to measure firms’ exposures to 
systematic default risk. 
Table 6 summarizes Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression results when monthly 
credit risk premium (in %) is regressed on lagged systematic default risk beta 
(           as calculated in equation 5) and firm characteristics that are related to 
credit risk.  In the regression, we control for the CAPM beta (BETACAPM), return 
volatility (SIGMA), profitability (NIMTAAVG), leverage (TLMTA), amount of liquid 
assets (CASHMTA), market-to-book ratio (MB), and relative size of the firm (RSIZE).  
We also control for two bond characteristics: average issue amount (OAMT) and average 
time to maturity (TTM) of a firm’s outstanding bonds.  As alternative credit risk 
measures, we include Merton’s distance to default (DD), physical default probability 
(PD), and the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) rating (RATING).  The t-statistics for the slopes 
are based on the time series variability of the estimates, incorporating a Newey-West 
(1987) correction with four lags to account for possible autocorrelation in the estimates.  
In column 1, we control for stock characteristics that have been shown to be important 
determinants of credit risk by CHS (2008) as well as time to maturity and the offering 
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amount of the firm’s outstanding bonds.  In column 2 we control for rating and Merton’s 
distance to default, in addition to time to maturity and bond offering amount.  In column 
3 we control for time to maturity, offering amount of the bond, Merton’s distance to 
default and the physical probability of default.  In column 4 we control for all the CHS 
(2008) variables, firm rating, Merton’s distance to default, and the physical probability of 
default.  In all specifications the loading on systematic default risk beta,             
is positive and statistically significant. 
The impact of            on spreads is also economically significant.  Results in 
column 4 of Table 6 suggest that moving from the 75
th
 percentile systematic default risk 
beta firm (           = 0.156) to the 95th percentile firm (           = 0.954) 
leads to an increase of 45 basis points in bond risk premium after controlling for all 
parameters known to influence credit spreads.    
The results suggest that systematic default risk exposure is an important driver of the 
credit risk premium in corporate bond spreads. CRP, our measure of exposure to 
systematic default risk computed from corporate bond spreads, and systematic default 
risk beta (            are comparable proxies for exposure to systematic default risk.  
In the next section we use systematic default risk beta (            to examine the 
pricing of systematic default risk in the cross section of equity returns in the CRSP-
COMPUSTAT sample. 
 
6.3 Pricing of Systematic Default Risk in the CRSP-COMPUSTAT Sample 
The systematic default risk beta described in the previous section allows us to test 
whether systematic default risk is priced in the larger CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample. In 
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Section 5.2, our analysis was confined to firms that have outstanding bonds because we 
used the bond credit risk premium as our proxy for systematic default risk compensation.   
In this section, we use the same portfolio analysis approach described in Section 5.  
In particular, we sort stocks into deciles each month from January 1981 through 
December 2010 according to their systematic default risk betas obtained at the beginning 
of the previous month. We then calculate the value-weighted decile portfolio returns for 
all stocks in the CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample on a monthly basis and regress the 
portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate on the market (MKTRF), size (SMB), value 
(HML), and momentum (MOM) factors. In Table 7, we report regression results for only 
the top and bottom decile portfolios along with the top decile minus bottom decile hedge 
portfolio to save space.   
Results in Table 7, which are obtained from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample, are 
similar to those reported in Table 5, which are obtained using the bond sample.  Table 5 
shows that the highest CRP decile portfolio earns on average 52 basis points more per 
month compared to the lowest CRP decile portfolio.  Similarly, Table 7 shows that the 
highest systematic default risk beta decile portfolio in the full CRSP-COMPUSTAT 
sample earns 46 basis points more per month compared to the lowest systematic default 
risk beta decile portfolio.  This result is significant at the 10% level.  Once we control for 
the market factor, the statistical significance of the hedge portfolio return disappears, 
suggesting a strong link between systematic default risk and market risk.  Controlling for 
Fama-French size and value factors further reduces the economic and statistical 
significance of the systematic default risk premium, supporting the Fama and French 
(1992) conjecture that size and value premiums may be related to systematic distress risk.  
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Overall, the results in this section verify the robustness of using credit spreads as a proxy 
for systematic default risk exposure and confirm our results in Section 5. 
 
7. Systematic Default Risk Exposure and Leverage 
Systematic default risk exposure measures we have created allow us to verify 
potential explanations of the distress risk premium anomaly.   George and Hwang’s 
(2010) theoretical model suggests that firms with high exposures to systematic distress 
risk lower their physical default probabilities by choosing low levels of leverage in an 
attempt to reduce distress costs. We provide empirical evidence for this hypothesis using 
the two measures of systematic default risk exposure utilized in this paper.  In particular, 
we show that an increase in systematic distress risk exposure predicts a reduction in 
leverage in the next period.   
In Table 8, we sort stocks annually and put them into ten groups based on changes in 
systematic default risk beta (SYSDEFBETA) and changes in credit risk premium (CRP).  
We then compute average changes in leverage over the next year.  The results indicate 
that firms which see an increase in their systematic default risk exposure reduce their 
leverage and their physical default probabilities in the next period in both samples
21
.   In 
Table 9, following Frank and Goyal (2003) and Rajan and Zingales (1995), we run a 
fixed effects regression to test the relationship more formally.  We control for 
profitability (NIMTA), market-to-book ratio (MB), the log of total sales (LogSALE) and 
tangibility of assets (TANG). The regression results show that there is a strong negative 
relationship between systematic default risk exposure and leverage.  In addition to 
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 In Table 8 we measure physical probability of default using the CHS-score.  CHS-Score is the 
transformation of the physical default probability computed as  ln[(1/ PD)-1]:  Higher CHS-scores suggest 
lower physical probabilities of default. 
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providing empirical support to the George and Hwang (2010) hypothesis, these results 
also support the basic premise of our paper that when assessing the default risk premium 
in the cross section of equity returns one should use exposure to systematic default risk 
and not the physical probability of default.   
 
8. Conclusion 
We argue that the distress risk anomaly documented in the cross section of equity returns 
is due to mismeasuring systematic default risk.  Previous papers measure financial 
distress by computing firms’ expected probabilities of default inferred from historical 
default data.  This calculation ignores the fact that firm defaults are correlated and that 
some defaults are more likely to occur in bad times, thus failing to appropriately account 
for the systematic nature of default risk.  We use credit risk premium obtained from 
corporate credit spreads to proxy for a firm’s exposure to systematic default risk.  Unlike 
previously used measures that proxy for physical probabilities of default, credit risk 
premia proxy for risk-adjusted default probabilities, reflecting the risk premium for the 
non-diversifiable component of distress risk.  We find that stocks that have higher credit 
risk premium have higher expected equity returns.  Consistent with structural models of 
default, we also show that the premium to a high minus low systematic default risk hedge 
portfolio is largely explained by the market factor, suggesting that CAPM beta captures 
most of the variation in systematic default risk exposure.  
The empirical results in the paper lend support to the George and Hwang (2010) 
hypothesis that firms with higher sensitivities to systematic default risk make capital 
structure choices that reduce their overall physical probabilities of default. We find that 
changes in systematic distress risk exposure predict changes in leverage in the next 
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period offering a potential explanation for the anomalous results previously documented 
in the literature. 
To show that our results are robust to sample biases, we conduct two analyses. First, 
we show that when firms in our Bond sample are ranked according to traditional 
measures of default risk used in the literature, the default risk anomaly exists in the bond 
sample. Second, we construct an alternative proxy to measure systematic default risk 
exposure (            and extend the analyses to the full CRSP sample.  We obtain 
results similar to what we find using the bond sample.  These results are consistent with 
the basic structural models of default in which aggregate risk factors drive the default 
probability as well as the returns on bonds and equities.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Here we explain the details of the variables used to compute the physical probability of default 
(PD) and the Merton distance-to-default (DD) measure. We use quarterly accounting data from 
COMPUSTAT and monthly market data from CRSP.  MB is the market-to-book ratio.  Book 
equity, BE is defined as in Davis, Fama, and French (2000).  To deal with outliers, we adjust total 
value of assets, TA (COMPUSTAT quarterly data item: ATQ) by the difference between the 
market equity (ME) and book equity (BE):   
, , , ,0.1( )i t i t i t i tMTA TA ME BE
.
 
(A.1) 
NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of net income 
(data item: NIQ) to adjusted total assets: 
2
1, 12 1, 3 10, 1212
1
...
1t t t t t t
NIMTAAVG NIMTA NIMTA
.
 (A.2) 
 
EXRETAVG is a geometrically declining average of monthly log excess stock returns 
relative to the S&P 500 index: 
11
1, 12 1 1212
1
...
1t t t t
EXRETAVG EXRET EXRET
.
 (A.3) 
The weighting coefficient is set to  = 2−1/3, such that the weight is halved each quarter. 
TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities (data item: NIQ) to adjusted total assets.  SIGMA is 
the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the previous three months.  SIGMA is 
coded as missing if there are fewer than five observations.  RSIZE is the log ratio of 
market capitalization to the market value of the S&P 500 index.  CASHMTA is the ratio 
of the value of cash and short-term investments (data item: CHEQ) to the value of 
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adjusted total assets.  PRICE is the log price per share truncated from above at $15. All 
variables are winsorized using a 1/99 percentile interval in order to eliminate outliers.  
We follow CHS (2008) and Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lunstedt (2004) to 
calculate Merton’s distance-to-default measure.  Market value of equity is modeled as a 
call option on the company’s assets: 
  
       
           
             
             
   
   (
  
 )  (    
  
 
 )  
  √ 
         √  
(A.4) 
 
EV  is the market value of a firm.  AV  is the value of the firm’s assets. X is the face value 
of debt maturing at time T.  r is the risk-free rate, and d  is the dividend rate expressed in 
terms of 
AV .     is the volatility of the value of assets, which is related to equity 
volatility,   , through the following equation: 
 
 
   
   
          
  
       (A.5) 
 
We simultaneously solve the above two equations to find the values of 
AV  and   . We 
use the market value of equity for 
EV and short-term plus one-half long-term book debt to 
proxy for the face value of debt X (data items: DLCQ+1/2*DLTTQ).    is the standard 
deviation of daily equity returns over the past three months.  T equals one year, and r is 
the one-year treasury bill rate. The dividend rate, d, is the sum of the prior year’s 
common and preferred dividends, obtained from COMPUSTAT Annual, (data items: 
DVP+DVC) divided by the market value of assets.  We use the Newton method to 
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simultaneously solve the two equations above.  For starting values for the unknown 
variables we use, 
A EV V X , and ( )A E E Es s V V X .  Once we determine asset 
values, 
AV , we then compute asset returns as in Hillegeist et al. (2004): 
 
      [
             
      
] (A.6) 
 
Because expected returns cannot be negative, if asset returns are below zero, they are set 
to the risk-free rate.
22
  Merton’s distance to default is finally computed as:  
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(A.7) 
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 We obtain similar results if we use a 6% equity premium instead of asset returns as in CHS (2008). 
  32 
References 
 
Almeida, H., and T. Philippon. 2007. “The Risk-Adjusted Cost of Financial Distress.” 
Journal of Finance 62(6): 2557–2586. 
 
Altman, E. 1968. “Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of 
Corporate Bankruptcy.” Journal of Finance 23(4): 589–609. 
  
Altman, Edward I., and Vellore M. Kishore. 1998. “Defaults and Returns on High Yield 
Bonds: Analysis through 1997.” Working paper, NYU Salomon Center. 
 
Amihud, Yakov. 2002. “Illiquidity and Stock Returns: Cross-Section and Time Series 
Effects.” Journal of Financial Markets 5(1): 31–56. 
 
Ang, Andrew, Robert J. Hodrick, Yuhang Xing, and Xiaozan Zhang. 2006. “The Cross-
Section of Volatility and Expected Returns.” Journal of Finance 61: 259–299. 
 
Ang A., R. Hodrick, Y. Xing, and X. Zhang. 2009. “High Idiosyncratic Volatility and 
Low Returns: International and Further U.S. Evidence.” Journal of Financial Economics 
91: 1–23. 
 
Avramov, Doron, Tarun Chordia, Gergana Jostova, and Alexander Philipov. 2009. 
“Credit Ratings and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns.” Journal of Financial Markets 
12(3): 469–499. 
 
Avramov, Doron, Gergana Jostova, and Alexander Philipov. 2007. “Understanding 
Changes in Corporate Credit Spreads.” Financial Analysts Journal 63(2): 90–105 
 
Bakshi, G., D. Madan, and F. Zhang. 2006. “Investigating the Role of Systematic and 
Firm-Specific Factors in Default Risk: Lessons from Empirically Evaluating Credit Risk 
Models.” Journal of Business 79: 1955–1988. 
 
Barberis, Nicholas, and Ming Huang. 2001. “Mental Accounting, Loss Aversion, and 
Individual Stock Returns.” Journal of Finance 56: 1247–1292. 
 
Berndt, A., R. Douglas, D. Duffie, M. Ferguson, and D. Schranz. 2005. “Measuring 
Default Risk Premia from Default Swap Rates and EDFs.” Working paper, Stanford 
University. 
 
Bharath, Sreedhar, and Tyler Shumway. 2008. “Forecasting Default with the KMV 
Merton Model.” Review of Financial Studies 21(3): 1339–1369. 
 
Blanco, R., S. Brennan, and I. W. Marsh. 2005. “An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic 
Relationship between Investment Grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps.” Journal of 
Finance 60: 2255–2281. 
 
  33 
Brennan, Michael J., Tarun Chordia, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam. 1998. “Alternative 
Factor Specifications, Security Characteristics, and the Cross-Section of Expected Stock 
Returns.” Journal of Financial Economics 49: 345–373. 
 
Campbell, John Y., Jens Hilscher, and Jan Szilagyi, 2008. “In Search of Distress Risk.” 
Journal of Finance 63: 2899–2939. 
 
Campbell, John Y., and Glen B. Taksler. 2003. “Equity Volatility and Corporate Bond 
Yields.” Journal of Finance 58: 2321–2350. 
 
Campello, M., L. Chen, and L. Zhang, 2008. “Expected Returns, Yield Spreads, and 
Asset Pricing Tests.” Review of Financial Studies 21: 1297–1338. 
 
Carhart, Mark. 1997. “On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance.” Journal of Finance 
52(1): 57–82. 
 
Chan, K. C., and Nai-fu Chen. 1991. “Structural and Return Characteristics of Small and 
Large Firms.” Journal of Finance 46: 1467–1484. 
 
Chava, Sudheer, and Robert A. Jarrow, 2004. “Bankruptcy prediction with Industry 
Effects.” Review of Finance 8: 537–569. 
 
Chava, Sudheer, and A. Purnanandam. 2010. “Is Default Risk Negatively Related to 
Stock Returns?” Review of Financial Studies 23: 2523–2559. 
 
Chen, L., D. A. Lesmond, and J. Wei. 2007. “Corporate Yield Spreads and Bond 
Liquidity.” Journal of Finance 62:, 119–149. 
 
Chernih, Andrew, S. Vanduffel, and L. Henrard. 2006. “Asset Correlations: A Literature 
Review and Analysis of the Impact of Dependent Loss Given Defaults.” Working paper. 
 
Cochrane, John H. 1991. “Production-based Asset Pricing and the Link between Stock 
Returns and Economic Fluctuations.” Journal of Finance 46:, 209–237. 
 
Collin-Dufresne, Pierre, Robert S. Goldstein, and J. Spencer Martin, 2001. “The 
Determinants of Credit Spread Changes.” Journal of Finance 56: 2177–2207. 
 
Conrad, Jennifer, Nishad Kapadia, and Yuhang Xing. 2012. “What explains the distress 
risk puzzle: death or glory?” Working paper, UNC Chapel Hill and Rice University. 
 
Da, Zhi, and Pengjie Gao, 2010. “Clientele Change, Liquidity Shock, and the Return on 
Financially Distressed Stocks.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 45: 27–
48. 
 
Das, Sanjiv R., Darrell Duffie, Nikunj Kapadia, and Leandro Saita. 2007. “Common 
Failings: How Corporate Defaults Are Correlated.” Journal of Finance 72(1): 93–117. 
 
  34 
Daniel, Kent, Mark Grinblatt, Sheridan Titman, and Russ Wermers. 1997. “Measuring 
Mutual Fund Performance with Characteristic-Based Benchmarks.” Journal of Finance 
52(3): 1035–1058. 
 
Dichev, Ilia D. 1998. “Is the Risk of Bankruptcy a Systematic Risk?” Journal of Finance 
53(3): 1131–1147. 
 
Dimitrov, Valentin, and P. Jain, 2008. “The Value-Relevance of Changes in Financial 
Leverage beyond Growth in Assets and GAAP Earnings.” Journal of Accounting, 
Auditing & Finance 23: 191–222. 
 
Downing, Chris, Shane Underwood, and Yuhang Xing. 2005. “Is Liquidity Risk Priced in 
the Corporate Bond Market?” Working paper, Rice University. 
 
Driessen, J. 2005. “Is Default Event Risk Priced in Corporate Bonds?” Review of 
Financial Studies 18(1): 165–195. 
 
Driessen, J., and Frank de Jong. 2007. “Liquidity Risk Premia in Corporate Bond 
Markets.” Management Science 53(9): 1439–1451. 
 
Duffee, Gregory. 1999. “Estimating the Price of Default Risk.” Review of Financial 
Studies 12: 197– 226. 
 
Duffie, Darrell, and Kenneth J. Singleton. 1995. “Modeling Term Structures of 
Defaultable Bonds.” Working paper, Stanford Graduate School of Business. 
 
Duffie, Darrell, and Kenneth J. Singleton. 1997. “An Econometric Model of the Term 
Structure of Interest-Rate Swap Yields.” Journal of Finance 52: 1287–1321. 
 
Duffie, D., L. Saita, and K. Wang. 2007. “Multi-Period Corporate Default Prediction with 
Stochastic Covariates.” Journal of Financial Economics 83(3): 635–665. 
 
Elton, Edwin J., Martin J. Gruber, Deepak Agrawal, and Christopher Mann. 2001. 
“Explaining the Rate Spread on Corporate Bonds.” Journal of Finance 56(1): 247–277. 
 
Eom, Young Ho, Jean Helwege, and Jing-Zhi Huang. 2004. “Structural Models of 
Corporate Bond Pricing: An Empirical Analysis.” Review of Financial Studies 17: 499–
505. 
 
Falkenstein, Eric G. 1996. “Preferences for Stock Characteristics as Revealed by Mutual 
Fund Portfolio Holdings.” Journal of Finance 51: 111–135. 
  
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French. 1992. “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock 
Returns.” Journal of Finance 47(2): 427–465. 
 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French. 1993. “Common Risk Factors in the Returns 
on Stocks and Bonds.” Journal of Financial Economics 33: 3–56. 
 
  35 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French. 1996. “Multifactor Explanations of Asset 
Pricing Anomalies.” Journal of Finance 51: 55–84. 
 
Fama, Eugene F., and James D. MacBeth. 1973. “Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: 
Empirical Tests.” Journal of Political Economy 81: 607–636. 
 
Frank, Murray Z., and Vidhan K. Goyal. 2003. “Testing the pecking order theory of 
capital structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 67: 217–248. 
 
Ferguson, Michael F., and Richard L. Shockley. 2003. “Equilibrium Anomalies.” Journal 
of Finance 58: 2549–2580. 
 
Garlappi, Lorenzo, Tao Shu, and Hong Yan. 2008. “Default Risk, Shareholder 
Advantage, and Stock Returns.” Review of Financial Studies 21(6): 2743–2778. 
 
George, Thomas J., and Hwang, Chuan-Yang. 2010. “A Resolution of the Distress Risk 
and Leverage Puzzles in the Cross Section of Equity Returns.” Journal of Financial 
Economics 96: 56–79. 
 
Gompers, P., and A. Metrick. 2001. “Institutional Investors and Equity Prices.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 116: 229–259. 
 
Griffin, John M., and Michael L. Lemmon. 2002. “Book-to-Market Equity, Distress Risk, 
and Stock Returns.” Journal of Finance 57:, 2317–2336. 
 
Hasbrouck, Joel. 2005. “Trading Costs and Returns for US Equities: The Evidence from 
Daily Data.” Unpublished paper, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York 
University. 
 
Hillegeist, Stephen A., Elizabeth Keating, Donald P. Cram, and Kyle G. Lunstedt. 2004. 
“Assessing the Probability of Bankruptcy.” Review of Accounting Studies 9: 5–34. 
 
Hilscher, Jens, and Wilson, M. 2010. “Credit Ratings and Credit Risk.” Working paper, 
Brandeis University. 
 
Hong, H., T. Lim, and  J. C. Stein. 2000. “Bad News Travels Slowly: Size, Analyst 
Coverage, and the Profitability of Momentum Strategies.” Journal of Finance 55: 265–
295. 
 
Huang, Jing-Zhi, and Ming Huang. 2003. “How Much of the Corporate-Treasury Yield 
Spread Is Due to Credit Risk?” Working paper, Pennsylvania State University. 
 
Hull, J., M. Predescu, and A. White. 2004. “The Relationship between Credit Default 
Swap Spreads, Bond Yields, and Credit Rating Announcements.” Journal of Banking and 
Finance 28(11): 2789–2811. 
 
  36 
Jegadeesh, Narasimhan, and Sheridan Titman. 1993. “Returns to Buying Winners and 
Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency.” Journal of Finance 48(1): 35–
91. 
 
Jones, Charles M., and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf. 2003. “The Price of Diversifiable Risk in 
Venture Capital and Private Equity.” Working paper, Columbia University. 
 
Kapadia, Nishad. 2011. “Tracking Down Distress Risk.” Journal of Financial Economics 
102: 167–182. 
 
Korteweg, Arthur. 2010. “The Net Benefits to Leverage.” Journal of Finance 65: 2137–
2170. 
 
Li, E. X., D. Livdan, and L. Zhang. 2007. “Anomalies.” Review of Financial Studies 
22(11): 4301–4334. 
 
Lin, Hai, Junbo Wang, and Chunchi Wu. 2011. “Liquidity Risk and the Cross-Section of 
Expected Corporate Bond Returns.” Journal of Financial Economics 99: 628–650. 
 
Lintner, John. 1965. “The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky 
Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets.” Review of Economics and 
Statistics 47: 13–37. 
 
Liu, Laura Xiaolei, Toni M. Whited, and Lu Zhang. 2009. “Investment‐Based Expected 
Stock Returns.” Journal of Political Economy 117(6): 1105–1139. 
 
Longstaff, F., S. Mithal, and E. Neis. 2005. “Corporate Yield Spreads: Default Risk or 
Liquidity? New Evidence from the Credit–Default Swap Market.” Journal of Finance 
60(5): 2213–2253. 
 
Longstaff, Francis A., and Eduardo S. Schwartz. 1995. “A Simple Approach to Valuing 
Risky Fixed and Floating Rate Debt.” Journal of Finance 50(3): 789–821. 
 
Malkiel, Burton G., and Yexiao Xu. 2002. “Idiosyncratic Risk and Security Returns.” 
Working paper, University of Texas at Dallas. 
 
Merton, Robert C. 1974. “On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of 
Interest Rates.” Journal of Finance 29: 449–470. 
 
Merton, Robert C. 1987. “A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with 
Incomplete Information.” Journal of Finance 42: 483–510. 
 
Nagel, Stefan. 2005. “Short Sales, Institutional Investors and the cross-section of Stock 
Returns.” Journal of Financial Economics 78: 277–309. 
 
Newey, Whitney, and Kenneth West. 1987. “A Simple Positive Semi-Definite, 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix.” Econometrica 
55:, 703–708. 
  37 
 
Ohlson, James A. 1980. “Financial Ratios and the Probabilistic Prediction of 
Bankruptcy.” Journal of Accounting Research 18: 109–131. 
 
Pastor, Lubos, and Robert F. Stambaugh. 2003. “Liquidity risk and expected stock 
returns.” Journal of Political Economy 111: 642--685 
 
Pastor, Lubos, and Pietro Veronesi. 2003. “Stock Valuation and Learning about 
Profitability.” Journal of Finance 58(5): 1749–1790. 
 
Penman, S., S. Richardson, and I. Tuna. 2007. “The Book-to-Price Effect in Stock 
Returns: Accounting for Leverage.” Journal of Accounting Research 45: 427–467. 
 
Rajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales. 1995. “What do we know about capital structure? 
Some evidence from international data.” Journal of Finance 50: 1421-1460. 
 
Roll, R. 1984. “A Simple Measure of the Bid-Ask Spread in an Efficient Market.” 
Journal of Finance 39: 1127–1140. 
 
Saita, L. 2006. “The Puzzling Price of Corporate Default Risk.” Working Paper, Stanford 
University. 
 
Sharpe, William F. 1964. “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium.” 
Journal of Finance 19: 425–442. 
 
Shumway, Tyler. 2001. “Forecasting Bankruptcy More Accurately: A Simple Hazard 
Model.” Journal of Business 74: 101–124. 
 
Vassalou, Maria, and Yuhang Xing. 2004. “Default Risk in Equity Returns.” Journal of 
Finance 59: 831–868. 
Zhang, Lu. 2007, March. “Discussion: ‘In Search of Distress Risk.’” Conference on 
Credit Risk and Credit Derivatives, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C 
Zhu, Haibin. 2006. “An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the Bond 
Market and the Credit Default Swap Market.” Journal of Financial Services Research 
29:211–235.  
 
Zmijewski, Mark E. 1984. “Methodological Issues Related to the Estimation of Financial 
Distress Prediction Models.” Journal of Accounting Research 22: 59–82.
 38 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for firm characteristics and distress measures for companies in the CRSP sample (left panel) and the bond sample (right panel).  MB is the 
market-to-book ratio, and ME is market capitalization in millions of dollars. CASHMTA is the ratio of cash to the market value of total assets. EXRETAVG is a geometrically 
declining average of monthly log excess stock returns relative to the S&P 500 index. NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of net income to 
the market value of total assets.  TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of total assets, and RSIZE is the log ratio of market capitalization to the market value of 
the S&P 500 index.  IDIOVOL is the standard deviation of regression errors obtained from regressing daily excess returns on the Fama and French (1993) factors. TOTVOL is the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns over the previous twelve months. PRICE is the log price per share truncated  at $15. PD is the physical probability of default reported as a 
percentage.  DD is the Merton distance to default measure.  The Appendix describes how these variables are calculated. P25, P50, and P75 represent 25
th
, 50
th,
 and 75
th
 percentiles, 
respectively.  Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
  CRSP Sample Bond Sample   
Variables Mean STD P25 P50 P75 Mean STD P25 P50 P75 Difference 
MB 1.983 1.466 0.900 1.533 2.644 1.794 1.131 0.999 1.486 2.268 0.189*** 
ME 1,273.8 5,713.0 20.7 91.8 271.6 5,327.7 17,251.1 417.5 1,297.2 3,811.6 -4,053.4*** 
CASHMTA 0.091 0.091 0.024 0.070 0.114 0.050 0.058 0.010 0.028 0.070 0.041*** 
EXRETAVG -0.010 0.043 -0.034 -0.006 0.018 -0.001 0.030 -0.017 0.000 0.016 -0.008*** 
NIMTAAVG 0.003 0.015 -0.001 0.005 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.012 -0.005*** 
TLMTA 0.413 0.282 0.159 0.374 0.643 0.536 0.229 0.360 0.535 0.708 -0.123*** 
RSIZE -10.708 1.604 -11.907 -10.790 -9.617 -8.031 1.160 -8.724 -7.701 -7.113 -2.677*** 
IDIOVOL 0.035 0.027 0.018 0.028 0.044 0.018 0.010 0.012 0.015 0.020 0.018*** 
TOTVOL 0.037 0.028 0.020 0.030 0.046 0.020 0.010 0.014 0.018 0.023 0.017*** 
PRICE 2.116 0.705 1.646 2.431 2.708 2.635 0.263 2.708 2.708 2.708 -0.519*** 
PD * 100 0.081 0.155 0.021 0.039 0.078 0.043 0.067 0.020 0.031 0.048 3.762*** 
DD 7.094 39.000 2.906 5.024 8.177 8.384 5.856 5.063 7.518 10.643 -1.290*** 
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Table 2: Default Prediction   
Table 2 reports results from hazard regressions of the default indicator on the predictor variables.  The data are constructed 
such that all of the predictor variables are observable 12 months before the default event. NIMTAAVG is a geometrically 
declining average of past values of the ratio of net income to the market value of total assets. TLMTA is the ratio of total 
liabilities to the market value of total assets. EXRETAVG is a geometrically declining average of monthly log excess stock 
returns relative to the S&P 500 index. SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the previous three 
months. RSIZE is the log ratio of market capitalization to the market value of the S&P 500 index. CASHMTA is the ratio of 
cash to the market value of total assets. MB is the market-to-book ratio; PRICE is the log price per share truncated at $15, 
and DD is Merton’s distance to default. These variables are described in detail in the Appendix. Results under “All Firms” 
are estimates computed using the full CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample of defaults with available accounting information.  
Results under “CHS Sample” show the estimates CHS (2008) report in their paper.  Results under “Firms with Bonds” are 
estimates computed using the sample of defaults from companies that have issued bonds with available accounting 
information.  Absolute values of z-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  McFadden pseudo R
2
 
values are reported for each regression.  Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample Period: 1981–2010 1963–2003 1981–2010 1981–2010 1981–2010 1981–2010 
Lag  (Months) 12 12 12 12 12 12 
NIMTAAVG -21.989*** -20.260*** -18.308***    
 (10.33) (18.09)   (2.74)    
TLMTA    2.188***    1.420***    1.503***    
 (16.84) (16.23)   (2.76)    
EXRETAVG   -7.871***   -7.13***   -6.241**    
 (10.28) (14.15)   (2.13)    
SIGMA    1.461***    1.410***    1.774***    
 (11.19) (16.49)   (5.17)    
RSIZE -0.063***   -0.045**   -0.614***    
 (4.21)   (2.09)   (7.28)    
CASHMTA -1.516***   -2.130***   -1.064    
 (7.85)   (8.53)   (1.21)    
MB 0.085***    0.075***    0.127    
 (2.63)  (6.33)   (0.91)    
PRICE -0.167*  -0.058   -0.017    
 (1.74)  (1.40)   (0.95)    
DD      -0.356***   -0.345***   -0.460*** 
    (17.18) (33.73)   (8.07) 
       
CONSTANT -9.718*** -9.160*** -13.844***   -3.401*** Not   -2.634*** 
 
(18.12) 
 
(30.89)   (8.90) (48.52) Reported (11.10) 
Observations 993,560 1,565,634 54,551 993,560 1,565,634 54,551 
Defaults 728 1968 118 728 1968 118 
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.114 0.156    0.083   0.066   0.129   
Sample Type 
All Firms in  
CRSP-
COMPUSTAT 
CHS Sample, 
CHS (2008) 
Firms with 
Bonds 
All Firms in  
CRSP-
COMPUSTAT 
CHS Sample, 
CHS (2008) 
Firms with 
Bonds 
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Table 3: Expected Losses, Taxes, and Liquidity Premia in Credit Spreads 
In Table 3, we report average credit spreads, spreads in excess of expected losses and taxes and liquidity premium for various 
rating-maturity groups.  Column (1) reports corporate bond yields minus maturity-matched government treasuries; column (2) 
reports spreads in excess of expected losses and taxes; and column (3) reports the liquidity premium for each corresponding 
rating/maturity portfolio. The estimation of these components is described in Section 4.1.  Bonds with maturity greater than 
seven years are referred to as having “long maturity,” and bonds with maturity less than seven years are referred to as having 
“short maturity.”  
 
 
Portfolio Spread 
Spread in Excess of 
Expected Losses and 
Taxes Liquidity Premium 
AAA  short-mat 0.97% 0.62% 0.13% 
AAA  long-mat 0.95% 0.62% 0.23% 
AA  short-mat 1.04% 0.56% 0.24% 
AA  long-mat 1.26% 0.84% 0.35% 
A  short-mat 1.32% 0.81% 0.33% 
A  long-mat 1.28% 0.81% 0.41% 
BBB  short-mat 1.99% 1.20% 0.50% 
BBB  long-mat 2.06% 1.32% 0.73% 
BB   3.78% 2.09% 0.88% 
B   5.28% 2.10% 1.30% 
CCC   10.36% 4.75% 1.40% 
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Table 4: Distress Portfolio Returns Sorted on Physical Default Probabilities 
Table 4 reports time series averages, CAPM, 3-factor and 4-factor regression results for distress risk portfolios.  We sort 
stocks into deciles each month from January 1981 to December 2010 according to their physical default probabilities, 
obtained at the beginning of the previous month, calculated using the hazard coefficients computed using the CRSP-
COMPUSTAT sample (Panel A) and using the bond sample (Panel B).  We compute the value-weighted returns for these 
decile portfolios on a monthly basis and regress the portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate on the market (MKT), size 
(SMB), value (HML), and momentum (MOM) factors.  The factors are obtained from Ken French’s website  We report 
regression results for only the top and bottom decile portfolios as well as the high-minus-low distress risk hedge portfolio to 
save space.  Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses below their respective coefficient estimates. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Monthly Equity Returns For Default Risk Portfolios in the full CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample 
Physical PD’s constructed with coefficients from Column (1) of Table 2 
   Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM 
10th 0.608** 
      (2.01) 
      0.166 1.041*** 
     (0.99) (28.01) 
     0.433*** 0.879*** 0.109** -0.462*** 
   (2.86) (23.63) (2.17) (8.05) 
   0.096 0.949*** 0.083* -0.37*** 0.337*** 
  (0.72) (29.23) (1.94) (7.42) (11.05) 
  Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM 
90th -0.576 
      (1.19) 
      -1.216*** 1.507*** 
     (3.87) (21.46) 
     -1.509*** 1.511*** 0.923*** 0.43*** 
   (5.29) (21.63) ( 9.82) (3.99) 
   -0.736*** 1.351*** 0.981*** 0.219*** -0.772*** 
  (3.24) (24.48) (13.45) (2.58) (14.89) 
  Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM 
90th - 10th -1.184** 
      (2.34) 
      -1.382*** 0.466*** 
     (2.96) (4.28) 
     -1.942*** 0.632*** 0.814*** 0.892*** 
   (4.68) (6.04) ( 6.73) (6.02) 
   -0.832*** 0.402*** 0.898*** 0.589*** -1.109*** 
  (2.64) (5.69) (10.96) (6.25) (18.14) 
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Panel B: Monthly Equity Returns For Default Risk Portfolios in the Bond sample 
Physical PD’s constructed with coefficients from Column (3) of Table 2 
   Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM 
10th 0.825*** 
      (3.05) 
      0.382** 0.847*** 
     (2.29) (22.64) 
     0.385** 0.891*** -0.274*** 0.003 
   (2.36) (22.27) (5.18) (0.05) 
   0.271* 0.913*** -0.283*** 0.031 0.114*** 
  (1.65) (22.76) (5.41) (0.51) (3.07) 
  Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM 
90th 0.318 
      (0.82) 
      -0.323 1.224*** 
     (1.36) (22.92) 
     -0.694*** 1.437*** 0.009 0.685*** 
   (3.19) (26.89) (0.13) (8.39) 
   -0.217 1.345*** 0.047 0.566*** -0.475*** 
  (1.15) (29.42) (0.79) (8.14) (11.24) 
  Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM 
90th - 10th -0.507* 
      (1.66) 
      -0.705*** 0.378*** 
     (2.60) (5.74) 
     -1.079*** 0.546*** 0.284*** 0.682*** 
   (3.83) (7.89) (3.10) (6.45) 
   -0.487** 0.432*** 0.330*** 0.535*** -0.589*** 
  (1.97) (7.17) (4.20) (5.84) (10.58) 
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Table 5: Monthly Equity Returns for Credit Risk Premium Portfolios  
In Table 5, we report time series averages, CAPM, 3-factor, and 4-factor regression results for distress risk portfolios. Each 
month from January 1981 through December 2010, we sort stocks into 10 portfolios based on their credit risk premia (CRP) at 
the beginning of the previous month. We compute the value-weighted return for these decile portfolios on a monthly basis and 
regress the portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate on the market (MKT), size (SMB), value (HML), and momentum 
(MOM) factors. The factors are obtained from Ken French’s website.  We report regression results for only the top and bottom 
decile portfolios to save space.  Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equity Returns in Credit Risk Premia Portfolios 
  
  
  Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM   
  
10th 0.463* 
     
  
  (1.65) 
     
  
  -0.074 0.826*** 
    
  
  (0.52) (23.63) 
    
  
  -0.021 0.890*** -0.319*** 0.020 
  
  
  (0.17) (27.51) (9.29) (0.47) 
  
  
  0.01 0.878*** -0.314*** 0.013 -0.03 
 
  
  (0.08) (26.00) (9.07) (0.29) (1.20) 
 
  
  Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM 
 
  
90th 0.984*** 
     
  
  (2.58) 
     
  
  0.325 1.014*** 
    
  
  (1.33) (17.12) 
    
  
  -0.193 1.28*** 0.157*** 0.715*** 
  
  
  (0.93) (22.83) (2.63) (9.62) 
  
  
  0.005 1.205*** 0.191*** 0.668*** -0.193*** 
 
  
  (0.02) (21.65) (3.34) (9.37) (4.64) 
 
  
  Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM 
 
  
90th - 10th 0.521** 
     
  
  (1.98) 
     
  
  0.399 0.188*** 
    
  
  (1.50) (2.91) 
    
  
  -0.172 0.391*** 0.476*** 0.695*** 
  
  
  (0.75) (6.32) (7.25) (8.49) 
  
  
  -0.005 0.327*** 0.505*** 0.656*** -0.163*** 
 
  
  (0.02) (5.21) (7.84) (8.15) (3.48) 
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Table 6: Pricing of Systematic Default Risk Beta in the Cross Section of Credit Spreads 
In Table 6, we run monthly Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions of credit risk premium (in %) on default risk prediction variables 
used in CHS 2008, firm rating, market beta, and systematic default risk beta. Our sample period covers January 1981 to 
December 2010. We report Fama-MacBeth regression coefficients as well as their corresponding Newey-West (1987) corrected 
t-statistics in parentheses.  Credit risk premium are calculated in month t+1 as the difference between the corporate bond yield 
and the corresponding maturity-matched treasury rate minus expected losses, liquidity compensation, and tax compensation. 
BETACAPM  is the firm’s CAPM beta at time t and is calculated using rolling regressions over the t-48 to t-1 time frame. 
SYSDEFBETA is the firm’s systematic default risk beta (failure beta) at time t and is calculated as the sensitivity of its default 
probability to the median default probability. SYSDEFBETA is also calculated over the t-48 to t-1 time frame on a rolling 
basis. SIGMA, NIMTAAVG, TLMTA , CASHMTA, MB, RSIZE, RATING, and DD are all calculated at time t. These variables are 
described in detail in Table 2. OAMT is the market value of debt at the time of its issuance in millions of dollars, and TTM is the 
time to maturity of debt in years. PD is the physical probability of default reported as a percentage. Absolute values of t-
statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is 
denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Credit Risk 
Premium 
Credit Risk 
Premium 
Credit Risk 
Premium 
Credit Risk 
Premium 
BETACAPM 0.072***    0.187**     0.189***     0.082*** 
  (2.64)   (4.54)   (5.18)    (2.90) 
SYSDEFBETA 0.555***    1.424***    1.408***     0.567*** 
  (3.74)   (7.08)   (6.93)    (4.38) 
SIGMA 3.556***   
 
    3.320*** 
  (16.23)   
 
 (13.18) 
NIMTAAVG -41.575***   
 
 -29.324*** 
  (10.29)   
 
   (8.75) 
TLMTA 0.442***   
 
    0.411*** 
  (5.75)   
 
   (4.50) 
CASHMTA -1.296***   
 
   -0.661*** 
  (5.16)   
 
   (2.80) 
OAMT -0.098***    -0.103*    -0.375***     0.023 
  (4.39)    (1.89)  (10.28)    (1.01) 
TTM 0.009***     0.012***     0.012***     0.009*** 
  (4.54)    (7.13)    (6.88)   (4.30) 
MB -0.019   
 
  -0.009 
  (1.10)   
 
  (0.70) 
RSIZE -0.569***   
 
  -0.428*** 
  (18.00)    (13.46) 
RATING 
 
   0.123***      0.086*** 
    (16.00)   (18.19) 
DD     -0.099***    -0.108***    0.023* 
      (9.20)    (9.82)   (1.80) 
PD*106   
 
  29.028***  10.969*** 
    
 
  (6.66)   (3.73) 
Constant -3.715***    0.889***    1.828***   -3.843*** 
  (16.49)   (5.68) (14.42) (15.85) 
Observations 83,202 83,020 83,124 83,020 
R-squared 0.501 0.459 0.370 0.601 
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Table 7: Equity Returns for Systematic Default Risk Beta Portfolios 
In Table 7, we report the time series averages, CAPM, 3-factor, and  4-factor regression results for distress risk portfolios. We 
sort stocks into deciles each month from January 1981 through December 2010 according to their systematic default risk 
betas—SYSDEFBETAs—obtained at the beginning of the previous month. We calculate the value-weighted decile portfolio 
returns for all stocks in the CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample on a monthly basis and regress the portfolio return in excess of the 
risk-free rate on the market-rf (MKTRF), size (SMB), value (HML), and momentum (MOM) factors. The factors are obtained 
from Ken French’s website. We report regression results for only the top and bottom decile portfolios along with the top decile 
minus bottom decile hedge portfolio to save space. Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient 
estimates. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
Equity Returns for SYSDEFBETA Portfolios  in CRSP 
  Alpha*100  MKT SMB HML MOM   
10th  1.187*** 
    
  
  (2.74) 
    
  
  0.214 1.199*** 
   
  
  (0.81) (19.82) 
   
  
  0.204 1.069*** 0.897*** 0.096 
 
  
  (0.72) (21.3) (13.01) (1.29) 
 
  
  0.501** 0.962*** 0.910*** -0.031 -0.320***   
  (2.16) (20.35) (14.63) (0.45) (7.88)   
  Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM   
90th   1.644*** 
    
  
   (3.13) 
    
  
    0.612* 1.313*** 
   
  
   (1.66) (15.93) 
   
  
   0.502 1.172*** 1.250*** 0.322*** 
 
  
  (1.52) (17.18) (13.33) (3.18) 
 
  
   0.909*** 1.024*** 1.270*** 0.144 -0.450***   
  (3.08) (16.03) (15.09) (1.55) (8.14)   
  Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM   
90th - 10th  0.457* 
    
  
  (1.70) 
    
  
   0.398 0.114** 
   
  
  (1.48) (1.97) 
   
  
   0.298 0.104* 0.353*** 0.226*** 
 
  
  (1.13) (1.75) (4.32) (2.59) 
 
  
   0.408 0.062 0.360*** 0.175** -0.130***   
  (1.54) (1.00) (4.43) (1.95) (2.61)   
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Table 8: Relationship between Leverage and Systematic Default Risk Exposure 
In Table 8, we report average changes in leverage and physical default risk for firms sorted in deciles formed on changes in 
systematic default risk exposure in the prior year.  Leverage is measured as the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of 
total assets.  CHS-Score is the transformation of the physical default probability computed as  ln[(1/ PD)-1]: Higher CHS-
scores suggest lower physical probabilities of default.  For the full CRSP-COMPUSTAT sample, each December from 1980 
through 2010, we sort stocks into 10 portfolios based on their year over year change in systematic default risk betas 
(∆SYSDEFBETA).  For the Bond sample, each December from January 1981 through 2010, we sort stocks into 10 portfolios 
based on their year over year change in value-weighted credit risk premia (∆CRP).  We then compute cross-sectional average 
values for changes in leverage (∆Leverage) and physical default risk (∆CHS-score) over the next year. If portfolios are formed 
in December 1990 on changes in systematic default risk from December 1989 to December 1990, then changes in leverage and 
physical default risk are computed from January 1991 to January 1992 
 
 
CRSP-COMPUSTAT Sample Bond Sample 
Portfolio 
(∆SYSDEFBETA) ∆Leverage 
∆CHS-
score   
Portfolio 
(∆CRP) ∆Leverage 
∆CHS-
score 
L 0.0078 -0.0064 
 
L 0.0055 -0.0992 
2 0.0049 -0.0714 
 
2 0.0056 -0.1000 
3 0.0097 -0.1050 
 
3 0.0015 -0.0402 
4 0.0094 -0.1022 
 
4 0.0009 -0.0110 
5 0.0095 -0.1039 
 
5 0.0041 -0.0397 
6 0.0086 -0.0499 
 
6 0.0021 -0.0093 
7 0.0069 -0.0324 
 
7 0.0012 -0.0135 
8 0.0035 -0.0248 
 
8 0.0053  0.0440 
9 -0.0019  0.0185 
 
9 0.0008  0.0131 
H -0.0161  0.1270   H -0.0070  0.0491 
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Table 9: Impact of Systematic Default Risk Exposure on Leverage 
Table 9 reports regression results where the dependent variable is the year over year change in leverage (∆Leverage), computed 
in year t. The independent variables are also year over year changes, computed in year t-1.  NIMTA measures profitability and 
is computed as the ratio of net income to the market value of total assets.  MB is the market-to-book ratio.  LogSALE is the log 
of total sales.  TANG measures tangibility of assets.   Credit risk premium (CRP) is the difference between the corporate bond 
yield and the corresponding maturity-matched treasury rate minus expected losses, liquidity compensation, and tax 
compensation.  SYSDEFBETA is the firm’s systematic default risk beta (failure beta) and is calculated as the sensitivity of its 
default probability to the median default probability.  The regression includes firm fixed effects.  Robust standard errors 
adjusted for ﬁrm-level clustering are reported below coefficient estimates.  Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
VARIABLES ∆Leverage ∆Leverage ∆Leverage 
∆NIMTA -0.217*** -0.217*** -0.462*** 
 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.139) 
∆MB -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
∆LogSALE  0.012***  0.012***  0.022*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) 
∆TANG -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.086*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.016) 
LEVERAGE -0.399*** -0.399*** -0.361*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.018) 
∆SYSDEFBETA 
 
-0.002** 
 
  
(0.001) 
 ∆CRP 
  
-0.579*** 
   
(0.140) 
Constant  0.160***  0.160***  0.180*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) 
    Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.279 0.279 0.277 
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Figure 1: Historical Corporate Default Rates 
This figure plots the historical default rates on Moody’s rated corporate issuers. The data is from Moody’s Investor 
Services.  Grey areas indicate NBER recessions. 
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Figure 2: Components of Corporate Spreads 
This figure plots the expected losses, taxes, and liquidity premium components of corporate spreads.  The estimation 
of these components is described in Section 4.1.  Bonds with maturity greater than seven years are referred to as 
having “long maturity” and bonds with maturity less than seven years are referred to as having “short maturity.” 
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